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THE U3C-IT MAY LOOK PRETTYr BUT IS IT
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JoHN A. SPANOGLE, JR.*
It is axiomatic that no regulatory legislation can be stronger
than its enforcement provisions. A statute may include many excel-
lent provisions regulating conduct, but these provisions will be
meaningless if the statute does not also provide for their effective
enforcement. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws is currently drafting a Uniform Consumer Credit
Code (hereafter called the U3C)1 to regulate the practices of those
who lend to consumers. This Code is supposed to replace all present
legislation regulating such lenders-small loan acts, retail install-
ment sales acts, truth-in-lending statutes, etc. There will undoubtedly
be many articles written comparing the regulatory provisions of the
present statutes with those of the U3C. However, all of these com-
parisons of regulatory provisions are dependent not only upon the
relative merits of the provisions themselves, but also upon the rela-
tive powers available for their enforcement. This article will examine
the enforcement provisions available under the USC and their
effectiveness.
A regulatory statute may be enforced through many different
devices. For example, different people can act against violators--
either public agencies or private individuals. The enforcer may seek
different types of remedies. He may seek only to prevent presently-
occurring violations from recurring, or to redress the effects of past
violations, or to punish past violations and therefore attempt to deter
future violations; or he may seek some combination of these three
powers. This article will examine the utility of these alternatives,
the devices and powers needed to effectuate them,2 and how effec-
tively the USC does or does not provide for them. Suggestions for
change will follow.
The primary policy question presented by the U3C is whether
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1 UNIFoRM CONSUMER CRDIT CODE (Working Draft No. 6, 1967) [hereafter cited as
the UBC to distinguish it dearly from the Uniform Commercial Code, the UCC. There
is no standard citation form, but a number of journals have adopted this form].
2 Thus this article will avoid discussion of the regulatory provisions of the UB5
whenever possible, as being outside its scope. Two classic enforcement devices will also
not be covered in detail: (1) licensing and (2) criminal penalties. But see notes 45,
104, and 157 infra. It will also avoid discussion of internal agency structure, and
procedures for agency proceedings.
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both public and private enforcement should be available in a con-
sumer protection statute. The draftsmen seem to have decided that
only public enforcement powers are needed, and have accordingly
reduced the enforcement powers available to individual aggrieved
consumers. Thus the present draft will be effective only in those
states having a well-financed, aggressive, consumer-oriented Admin-
istrator. It seems unlikely that all Administrators in 50 states for the
next 40 years will meet these criteria. Even those who do possess all
the necessary attributes will find that their own powers are limited,
and that the range of tools available to enforce the USG through
agency action is limited.
I. WHAT ENFORCEMENT PowERs ARE ErriHER
NECESSARY OR USEFUL?
Since a regulatory statute may be enforced either publicly or
privately, or both, the first question to consider is what persons
should be allowed to act against violators of the statute. In addition,
four functions should be performed by the enforcement provisions of
a regulatory statute: (1) It must provide a method of informing the
persons regulated concerning proposed courses of conduct and
whether they violate the statute. (2) It must provide a method of
stopping violations once they occur, and assuring that they will not
reoccur. If possible, it should also provide a method of restraining
violations before they occur. (3) It should provide a method of deter-
ring violations before they occur by penalizing violators. (4) It must
provide a method of redressing the effects of violations, and of com-
pensating the aggrieved party. The second question is what statutory
provisions are necessary to accomplish each function. Since the
method of accomplishing these functions will be different for public
and for private enforcement, the statutory provisions needed for
each type of enforcement will be discussed separately.
A. Who Should Enforce?
Is a public agency needed to enforce a consumer credit code?
There is general agreement that the majority of consumers do not
know their present rights against creditors, and even when they know
of a violation are often unable or unwilling to confront the creditor.3
In a field where the creditor is a professional, consumers are amateurs
3 That this is particularly true of the low.income buyer is evidenced by the
finding in one study that, although forty percent of poor consumers reported ex-
ploitation in their credit purchases, over half took no retaliatory steps and only nine
percent sought any form of professional help. D. CALovrrz, Tun PooR PAY MoRz
137-140, 171 (1963).
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at protecting themselves and unable to provide such protection con-
sistently. Thus a professional is needed to protect the public interest
consistently-an agency whose job it is to enforce the consumer's
rights under the statute. The agency should be fully staffed with
full-time personnel. It has been objected that merchants should not
be subject to such regulation, 4 presumably because they too are
amateurs at the lending business and do so only because of customer
demand. Unfortunately, this objection ignores the present scope of
installment selling,5 the number of consumer abuses it has produced,0
and the number of consumers adversely affected by the abuses." In
short, the problem has grown too large for amateur solutions ran-
domly raised in an ad hoc manner.8
If enforcement by a public agency is provided, is private en-
forcement needed also? There are significant dangers in any system
using only public enforcement which require that it be supplemented
by provisions for effective potential private enforcement. Industry
domination of its administrative agency is a well-known phenom-
enon.9 Sometimes this is accomplished through the appointment of
a "captive" commissioner. 10 However, more often it is accomplished
through less reprehensible means. The commissioner of a consumer
credit code is likely to be the banking commissioner or his sub-
4 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMaxISSIONER ON UNIFORM STATE LAWs, PROcEEDING$
PUBLIC HEARING ON SECOND TENTATIVE DRAFT OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
Part 6, at 347B, 349, 353, 353A (June 16-17, 1967).
5 Installment credit extended as of December 1967 totaled 77.946 billion dollars.
This figure does not include the rapidly expanding total of credit extended by means
of charge accounts. 54 FED. REs. BULL. No. 2, at A-52 (1968).
6 See Art. 2 of the U3C and retail installment acts generally by means of which
thirty-five states regulate automobile finance charges and twenty-six regulate other
installment credit charges. Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer In.
stalment Credit, 66 MICH. L. REv. 81, 87 (1967).
7 E.g., the Michigan Consumer Protection Division of the Officc of the Attorney
General processed 1,054 complaints in 1965 while in Washington over 6,000 complaints
have been incorporated into the files of the Consumer Protection Division since its
creation in 1961. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPoRT To THE COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
CONSUMER PROBLEMS I COLORADO, RESEARCH PUBUCATION No. 112 at 150, 159 (Nov.
1966).
8 See, e.g., 16 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 520.332 (Supp. 1968); IND. STAT. ANN. § 58.925
(1962); MASS. LAws ANN. ch. 255D § 6 (1968).
9 See, e.g., Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, The Rail-
roads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952).
10 See W. CAR.Y, POLITICs AND THE REGULATORY AGENcIES 67-68 (1967); Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 768 (1964); Boston Herald, Dec. 19, 1966, at 1.
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ordinate, or to be selected in approximately the same manner?' In
many states, such a commissioner must have had long experience in
the credit industry, usually working for a creditor.' With such a
background, the commissioner could have an orientation toward
creditors' problems and be more "understanding" of creditor viola-
tions than the consumer.
In either case, it is unlikely that such a commissioner would be
an aggressive "ombudsman" representing the consumer, thus reduc-
ing the consumer's protection to a minimal or an illusory level. The
consumer needs more than enforement of those provisions of the
statute which are clear against violations which are equally dear. He
also needs protection against questionable conduct by creditors,
which requires test cases where the statute is unclear, or even silent,
and the creditor's conduct is ambiguous. It also requires the develop-
ment of new theories supporting action, and this may be accom-
plished only by those who view the transactions as consumers.
Even where the industry does not dominate the agency, there
are necessary benefits from effective private enforcement. First, it
allows the consumer to act on his own initiative, either to deter or
to seek cessation of violations and redress. He does not have to obtain
the prior approval or cooperation of the agency, rely upon the quality
of its staff, or overcome its inertia, red tape and conservatism.' s
Secondly, it manifoldly increases the potential enforcement powers.
Few agencies have sufficient funds or manpower to maintain adequate
surveillance or to bring action against most violations discovered?14
Effective private enforcement would create thousands of additional
investigators and the local bar would provide many additional
prosecutors. Thirdly, it is more certain to provide appropriate re-
11 This, at least, has been the experience under the Small Loan Acts, and there
is no provision in the USC which attempts to change the trend. ME RE,. STAT. A.,.
tit. 9 §§ 222(2), 3121-22 (1964). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 2107 (1953); N.Y.
BANK. LAw § 360 (McKinney 1950).
12 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9 § 1 (Supp. 1967). See also GA. CODE ANN. 13-304 (19663);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 5242 (1949).
13 This may be the meaning of the language in the Prefatory Note to Working
Draft No. 6, USC at 3, [hereafter cited as Prefatory Note, U3C] suggesting a necessity
for ample "self-executing judicial remedies."
14 The utility, and even necessity, of this aspect of private policing is best exem-
plified in the area of antitrust regulation. The Antitrust Division staff would have to
be quadrupled to provide enforcement solely through public agency action. Barber,
Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson.Patmnan Experience, 30
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 181, 183 n.10 (1961); Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits: The
Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
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dress to the individual, especially if the agency does not have sufficient
authority to seek redress easily,15 or redress involves an election
by the consumer.16
Further, the arguments advanced against effective private en-
forcement do not show any adverse effect upon legitimate creditor
interests. A common argument for limiting private actions is that
they have not been used sufficiently in the past to be worth the
political and psychological strain of trying, over creditor opposition,
to provide them. This ignores any influence consumers or consumer
groups may have,17 but, more important, it ignores the needs of the
consuming public. Is past use, or lack of use, relevant if private
actions can assist the agency when used? Even as to the fact of non-
use, new procedures and programs, such as class actions,18 legal aid
offices and OEO neighborhood law offices, may soon render past
experience irrelevant by making opportunities to seek redress more
readily available. 19
Another argument often raised for limiting private enforcement
provisions is that forfeiture of both principal and interest for any
violation is the usual remedy given for successful private actions, and
this is too harsh a penalty.20 However, this argument assumes that
effective private enforcement requires such a remedy in all circum-
stances-an unwarranted assumption, as will be shown below. 21 In-
stead, it is quite possible to provide a set of graduated sanctions to
the consumer, to provide different deterrent effects in different
circumstances.
15 See text at notes 92-97 infra.
16 See text following note 144 infra.
17 NATL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, JOINT STATEMENT OF NLDA AND OEO
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM RE WORKING DRAFT No. 6 oF UCCC (January 10, 1968).
18 That the class action device is intended for and adapted to the protection of
small claimants is discussed in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494-95 (E.D.N.Y.
1968) (a class action on behalf of allegedly defrauded securities purchasers authorized
by FED. R. Cxv. P..23).
19 The conclusion that there has in fact been a lack of use in the past is also
open to question. It is primarily based on the absence of reported appellate cases,
but this does not indicate its utility at the trial court level, especially in small claims
courts. Further, it ignores any non-judicial use of such opportunities to influence
out-of-court settlements. Finally, it cannot measure the in terrorem influence of
potential actions to inhibit violations. Thus the case of past non-use is at best un-
proved.
20 Most Small Loan Acts so provided. F. HEMAc HE, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN
LAWs (Based on Sixth Draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law) 119-25 (1938). It is be-
lieved that this inhibited public enforcement.
21 See text at notes 52-59, infra.
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Thus a combination of both public and private enforcement
powers should be provided so that each can supplement the other.
Each can perform different functions, and each must be examined
separately to determine its capability of informing creditors and
halting, deterring and redressing violations of the statute.
B. Public Enforcement Provisions
As to the informational function, the vast bulk of creditors will
adhere to any regulations if they both know and understand their
effect. 22 Thus, the first requisite to any workable enforcement scheme
is to provide this information to creditors, and only a public agency
can furnish a consistent interpretation. The information can be
either general, relating to classes of problems, or specific, providing
answers to individual inquiries concerning particular proposed
courses of conduct. The agency must be able to provide both. Gen-
eral regulations, however detailed, cannot answer specific questions,
because the methods cf merchandising and lending to the consumer
are too diverse to fit any set of standard patterns. The agency must
therefore be empowered to issue advice in response to queries, and
also to issue formal declaratory orders. The creditors should be
furnished a dear procedure for raising such questions.2
Information must be available both on an informal and on a
formal basis, so that the creditor can obtain not only advice but also
a declaratory order. A declaratory order may be appealed from, but
advice or an advisory opinion typically may not.' Without declara-
tory orders which are appealable under the applicable statute, there
is no method of testing the agency beliefs in courts without first
violating the statute. If the informational function is to be properly
served, it should be available before the creditor violates the statute,
especially if other methods can be easily provided. In the consumer
field this may be especially important, because many merchants and
other creditors are conscious of consumer good will and would pre-
fer not to risk it by deliberately violating a statute if such conduct
can be avoided. A second, and less important, reason for declaratory
22 Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer.Credit Trans.
actions, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Ray. 535 (1967).
23 Although many states have administrative procedure acts which would provide
procedures for declaratory orders, a uniform act must provide such procedures for
states which do not have them. See W. GELLaORN & C. BvsE, ADMInTRATIE LAW,
app. I1, at 1231 (1960).
24 1 K. DAvis, AD MiNirAT IvE LAW TszATiss §§ 4.09, 4.10 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as DAvis].
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orders is that, if they are favorable, the creditor should be able to
rely on them and be protected from agency action against conduct
based on them. The orders should be subject to rescission after notice
and hearing, to provide flexibility in a field of rapidly changing
social values, but they should protect from agency action as long as
they are effective. The declaratory orders cannot preclude consumer
test cases in court, and may be invalidated by the courts. 25
It would probably be unwise, however, to require the agency
to issue such orders in all cases. Where the facts are predeterminable
and not easily modified, such as proposed creditor's forms or interest
rate structures, there seems no problem in requiring an order. On
the other hand, where the facts are fluid, such as proposed sales
techniques or debt collection tactics, the agency probably should not
give an unqualified assurance, since statutory compliance can only
be judged on the basis of actual conduct. Thus declaratory orders
should be mandatory only for a limited class of inquiries.20
If a creditor violates the statute or threatens to do so, the agency's
first concern should be to prevent the violations, or halt them and
prevent their recurrence. A wide range of devices must be provided
the agency because it will face a wide variety of situations involving
violations. Some will involve misinterpretations of the statute; others
deliberate abuses of consumers. Both informal and formal procedures
will be needed, involving both internal agency proceedings and
direct access to the courts, and permitting effective voluntary settle-
ments as well as enforcement through litigation. Above all, in the
many circumstances where mass public harm is threatened, for
example false advertising, the agency must be able to act very quickly
to protect the public interest effectively.
One informal method of halting violations is to accept an as-
surance of discontinuance from the creditor. In effect, the agency
accepts the creditor's promise to behave as a substitute for an order
25 Neither the principles of res judicata nor those of collateral estoppel would
apply to bar the consumer's private suit since he was not a party nor privy to the
original declaratory proceeding. See, RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 and comments
at 460-67 (1942). As to the res judicata effect of a declaratory proceeding between the
Administrator and a party to the order see L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw: CASEs AN MATERIALS 410 (2d ed. 1961).
26 REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURg AC § 8 (1961). If mandatory
for a limited class, the class could be determined by designating those sections of the
U3C which relate to the form of contracts, and omitting those sections which relate
to other creditor conduct. But cf., Note, The Availability and Reviewability of Rulings
of the Internal Revenue Service, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 81 (1964).
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resulting from more formal proceedings, but without the expense of
those formal proceedings. Since this device will be accepted in a
negotiating context, rather than in litigation, the agency must be
able to resolve fairly all issues relating to injuries to the public
interest while it is negotiating and deciding whether to accept the
assurance. Thus it should be able to condition its acceptance upon
obtaining admissions of the prior violations27 redress to all consumers
aggrieved by prior violations,28 and reimbursement to the agency for
money spent investigating the prior violationsm29 In addition, some
consideration should be given to the losses which can be caused by
future violations. Thus, in appropriate situations, another possible
condition should be the establishment of an escrow fund to provide
redress and cover investigation expenses of proven future violations.03
A more formal method of halting violations is the cease and
desist order, issued after notice and a hearing. Use of an agency pro-
ceeding, rather than a court proceeding, allows fact-finding by a
tribunal which specializes in such problems, and may therefore be
more aware of the business setting of the problem and the ramifica-
tions of its rulings.31 The agency must be able to act on its own
initiative, without a complaint from an aggrieved consumer 3 2 The
orders need not be self-executing and will in any event be subject to
judicial review.33 The review of findings of fact should be on the
record made in the agency, and the agency's expertise should be
27 The use of an admission as a prima facie case in subsequent proceedings is
granted to the New York attorney general in his public enforcement role. N.Y. ExEr.
LAw § 63(15) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
28 The State's interest in private redress is a function of its concern with public
welfare, a recognized area for exerdse of the police power. Miss. LAws ANN. ch. 93A
§ 5 (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2459 (Supp. 1968).
29 Authorities dted supra note 28. The New York attorney general may make the
payment of such costs a condition to his acceptance of an assurance of discontinuance
in lieu of prosecution for a violation of state law. N.Y. ExM. LAw § 63(15) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1967).
30 Such a procedure was suggested and adopted for use by the New York Con-
sumer Frauds Bureau. Memorandum of N.Y. Dept. of Law, 1965 McKinney's Session
Laws of New York 2070; N.Y. STATE FiNANcE Law § 121(2)o (McKinney Supp. 1966).
Such a provision should not be considered a penalty, since the UCC provides that an
analogous "guaranty" may be required as part of an assurance of performance in a
commercial transaction. UNiORm Comsm]cIAL CODE § 2-609, Comment 4.
31 1 DAvs, supra note 24, § 1.05 at 37-40.
32 Not all Administrators are authorized to act on their own initiative. See, eg.,
M. CODE ANN. art. 83 § 162(a) and (d) (1965).
33 3 DAwvs, supra note 24, § 29.11.
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recognized by adoption of the customary rule of upholding the
agency action if supported by credible evidence in the record.84
If the cease and desist orders are not self-executing, it will be
necessary to seek a court order for enforcement. This would require
two hearings and two notice periods before the violation is halted.
In many situations, such a lengthy reaction time will be unsatisfac-
tory; something quicker is needed to protect the public from future
mass violations. Thus the agency should be able to approach a court
directly, and on its own initiative, to seek to halt violations. It should
be able to seek temporary relief pending a hearing, under the normal
limitations traditionally provided by an equity court.85 As an addi-
tional violation-prevention device, the agency should be able to seize
and condemn any forms or advertising matter not in compliance with
the statute. 0 All such relief should be available to the agency on its
own initiative, without any prior complaints from aggrieved con-
sumers, because the purpose of agency enforcement is to obviate the
necessity of reliance on consumer initiatives. Thus it should be able
to provide continuous and consistent surveillance and enforcement,
regardless of the ability or willingness of the consuming public to
protect itself.
A second problem concerns the scope of the order. An order
merely to discontinue the exact form of present violation will often
be illusory, because a creditor may then change his practices slightly
and escape any effect of the order while still violating the statute.
Thus, the agency should be able to issue orders which cover practices
similar to the illegal acts which have actually occurred.81
In addition to halting the violations, the agency should be able
to redress past violations. This requires that it have power to strike
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b); authorities cited infrac note 89. One example of
the required "immediate and irreparable injury" is a mass fraudulent advertising
campaign.
36 See, e.g., the Federal provisions for seizure and forfeiture of "containcrs, ve-
hides and vessels" involved in violations of liquor transportation laws. 18 US.s.
§ 3615 (1964).
37 The cease and desist orders of some Federal agencies have been challenged
on the ground of overbreadth, but despite the fact that violation of the order would
subject the party to the summary penalty of a contempt decree broad language has
been upheld. For a general discussion of this issue see FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 US. 374, 392-95 (1965). On the State level a similarly broadly worded Injunction,
which traditionally must be specific, was upheld prohibiting demanding, receiving or
attempting to collect usurious interest, or charging or contracting for any usurious
interest. Wilson Finance Co. v. State, 342 S.W.2d 117 ('rex. Civ. App. 1960).
[Vol. 29
U3C ENFORCEABILITY
prohibited clauses from contracts already in existence or seek injunc-
tions against their enforcement, to require refunds of overcharges,
and to obtain rescission or cancellation of prohibited types of con-
tracts in appropriate cases. Where appropriate redress requires an
election by the consumer, such as to rescind a contract or not,38 the
agency must also be able to contact the consumer and obtain his
decision. Its ability to provide such redress can relieve the consumer
of the burden of initiating action to seek relief from either the
creditor or the courts, thereby raising the probability that the indi-
vidual consumer's rights will be protected. The agency should also
be able to obtain redress for itself.39 The investigation and prosecu-
tion of the creditor has required expenditures, and it should be
reimbursed if the creditor has violated the statute. Such expenses
should be borne by the creditor who caused them, rather than the
public at large. Reimbursement increases the agency's resources and
discourages any attempt to defeat enforcement through exhaustion
of the agency's resources, as through numerous appeals.
Where the agency seeks both to halt violations and to redress
past violations, this should not require separate actions. Thus, at
the informal level of enforcement, acceptance of an assurance of
discontinuance could be conditioned on providing redress to all in-
dividual aggrieved consumers. In agency proceedings, the agency
should be able to issue an order for redress as well as a cease and
desist order. In court, if the agency can represent the aggrieved con-
sumers as a class, it can obtain redress for them while obtaining an
injunction against creditor conduct. If separate actions are required
in any of these cases, the extra drain on agency resources will limit
the number of cases it can attempt to resolve.
Providing the agency with a deterrent capability is also a neces-
sity because simply stopping the present violations or preventing
their recurrence, or even providing redress for past violations, is
sometimes inappropriate. Lack of a deterrent allows the creditor to
violate the statute literally without risk. If he is later ordered to stop,
or even ordered to redress violations, he has lost nothing more than
his ill-gotten gains. Where he has nothing to lose by violating the
statute, he is less likely to be careful in observing the consumer's
rights. Any system which depends upon stopping a course of pro-
hibited conduct after it occurs is not effective at halting the first viola-
tions. Agency inertia or lack of manpower may allow these prior
3s See text following note 144 infra.
39 M. CoDE ANN. art. 83 § 25 (Supp. 1967).
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violations to continue for an extended time. Thus, the agency must
be given the ability to penalize past violations, thereby deterring
future violations.
Once the creditor has an opportunity to seek a declaratory order
on the propriety of any particular course of dealing, liability should
attach to any conduct which violates the statute. It may be objected
that most creditors are honest and should not be penalized for
honest mistakes, and that penalties should not be available unless
some form of mens rea can be proved.40 Such a limitation is not
relevant where declaratory orders are available. The limitation is
based on a belief that it is unjust to penalize for the first violation,
because the violator could not be certain that his conduct was illegal
until a court had so ruled. However, if declaratory orders are pro-
vided, the creditor has a method of obtaining a ruling on the validity
of his proposed conduct before acting. If he chooses either not to
seek such a ruling or to ignore a ruling before engaging in conduct
so questionable that it is later found illegal, a sanction should be
available.41 The purpose of a regulatory statute is to inhibit creditors
from carelessly engaging in questionable conduct, so that lack of
prior agency approval should be the only condition to liability for
some penalty. With regard to public enforcement, the agency is un-
likely to penalize a single clerical error arising under circumstances
unlikely to recur, as long as it is given discretion in such matters.
Thus, the agency should be able to seek sanctions against all violat-
ing conduct not protected by a ruling, regardless of "willfulness" but
at its discretion.42
What sanctions should be available? Obviously, the penalty
should be designed to fit the type of violation. But there are an almost
infinite number of relevant independent variables-the seriousness
of the type of violation, the number of occurrences, the prior history
of violations by the same creditor, the deliberateness of his conduct,
his willingness to halt violations and offer redress to consumers, the
necessity of litigation, and others. It must be recognized that the like-
40 Cf. U3C § 6.113(3), (4).
41 A different analysis may apply when the creditor has sought a declaratory
order, but has been unable to obtain one because the agency feels it cannot give a
sufficiently concrete and unqualified opinion to serve any purpose. See note 25 supra.
In this limited class of circumstances, imposing a penalty without a mens rea require-
ment would depend solely upon whether the legislature desired to use absolute la.
biity concepts in this area. See text at note 64 infra.
42 Such discretion would obviate the problems encountered under most Small
Loan Acts. See note 20 supra.
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lihood of discovery of violations is relevant, and will vary from state
to state. No agency can afford to undertake complete surveillance or
to litigate all violations discovered. In states where investigations and
enforcement are more extensive, an effective deterrent can be pro-
vided by use of smaller sanctions than in states where money and
manpower, and therefore the chances of discovery and enforcement,
are limited. Thus the extent of the penalty given through public
enforcement cannot be set by statute but must be discretionary. The
maximum penalties should be sufficiently great to deter prohibited
conduct,43 but the agency should be allowed to seek lesser penalties
where it sees fit.
C. Private Enforcement Provisions
The powers necessary to create effective private enforcement are
different and must be analyzed differently. One difference is that the
consumer cannot perform the informational function. Moreover, he
cannot be bound by the agency's declaratory orders, because he had
no opportunity to be heard before their issuance.44 If private enforce-
ment is the antidote to possible industry domination or agency
inertia, red tape or conservatism, the declaratory order cannot bar
private actions.45 Further, if private actions are to serve an effective
43 The possible sanctions include: (1) a civil penalty, (2) a criminal penalty and
(3) revocation of a license. Each presents problems concerning effective use. The dvil
penalty, if imposed, may easily be written off as just another cost of doing business,
especially if the maximum is low and the chance of enforcement small This device
is effective only if a penalty may be levied for each individual violation. As a mini-
mum, in all cases, the Administrator should be able to recover all the costs of in-
vestigating and prosecuting the violating creditor. Although this merely provides
redress for the Administrator, it is a penalty to the creditor.
Criminal sanctions and revocation of license cannot be dismissed in the same way.
They are, however, often dismissed on the ground that they are little used in prac-
tice. Felsenfeld, supra note 22. Such reactions may not, however, portray the complete
picture. For example, an attorney's advice to a client regarding a proposed course of
questionable conduct may be far less cautious when only money is being risked than
if criminal sanctions, and the attendant publicity, could be involved, even though a
criminal action has never been brought in the state.
44 See note 25 sup'ra.
45 Declaratory orders are generally treated as the same as other agency adjudica-
tions, e.g., Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 US.C. § 554(e) (1966). It does not
necessarily follow, however, that it is the product of a genuine adversary proceeding.
And while the agency is bound to protect the interests of consumers generally, it cannot
be presumed to have asserted and protected the interests of any particular consumer.
Compare the problem of inadequate representation in spurious class actions, FED. R.
Crv. P. 23(a).
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purpose, the declaratory order cannot defeat those parts of the indi-
vidual's recovery which seek to compensate him for the expenses of
such action or induce him to undertake the risks thereof.40
Once violations occur or are threatened, however, consumers
have an interest in halting or preventing them to at least the same
extent as the regulatory agency. The typical device available to
groups of individuals to prevent harm to the group is the class action,
but this is not available for prospective enforcement in its normal
state.47 Some of the problems are technical and relate only to use of
the normal class action device as such,48 and can be obviated by
expressly granting a right to enjoin the violation to an aggrieved
consumer.49 Would a grant of such a right be wise? It would permit
consumers to halt violations, and would also allow them to show the
entire pattern of operations of a violating creditor, which might be
necessary to overcome limitations on obtaining redress or imposing
sanctions under the statute. 0 On the other hand, prospective en-
forcement through private ombudsmen is not generally permitted.
If "all the world" are potential victims, assuring adequate repre-
sentation is difficult. Preclusion of subsequent actions by those claim-
ing non-representation is also difficult, and could provide opportunity
for collusion. If multiple injunction actions are allowed, the burden
on the creditor and the opportunity for harassment of the non-violat-
ing creditor are also great. However, limiting the right of action to
consumers already aggrieved by the violations and requiring the
posting of a bond to cover a successful creditor's costs could greatly
reduce such problems.5'
The consumer's primary interest is in obtaining redress for the
46 See text at notes 52-60 infra.
47 The primary problem is one of standing. See discussion in text at note 110
infra.
48 E.g., in addition to the standing problem, can anyone assure adequate repre.
sentation of an unborn potential victim, within FED. R. CIv. P. 23?
40 See N. Max. STAT. 49-15-8 (Supp. 1968) which allows an individual to enjoin
"deceptive trade practices" of another if he is "likely" to be damaged thereby. See also
Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
76 YALE L.J. 485, 495-501 (1967).
50 Although such limitations ought not to be placed on the consumer's right to
recover, see text at notes 63, 64 infra, the present draft of the USC does so limit them.
USC § 5.201.
51 For a far deeper and more illuminating discussion of these problems than Is
practicable for this article, generally affirming the consumer's right to enjoin, if prop.
erly limited, see Starts, The Consumer Class Action: Considerations of Equity and
Procedure, NAT'L INST. OF EDUC. IN LAW AND POVaRTY, HANDBOOK ON CoNsubER LAW
§ 74.2, at 23 (1968).
[Vol. 29
U3 C ENFORCEABILITY
violations of his rights. But this involves more than refunding an
overcharge or striking a prohibited clause from a contract. The con-
sumer whose statutory rights have been violated must be not only
made aware of the violation, but also willing and able to confront
the creditor and seek redress. Even after deciding to seek redress, he
can still lose all if he does not choose a response permitted by the
statute. If not aided by counsel, the violation might never be dis-
covered or the creditor confronted; and even if he seeks redress, the
unadvised consumer's instinctive reaction is to stop paying the debt,
which creates a default and all the creditor's remedies which arise
therefrom. Thus, any consumer protection statute must recognize
the necessity for the aggrieved consumer to consult an attorney, even
in the case which is settled out of court, and must actively seek to
promote such conduct.52
Attorneys, however, charge fees, and the fee for redressing the
creditor's violation will come out of the aggrieved consumer's pocket.
Thus, the consumer must invest money to obtain a redress of the
violation, even when litigation is not involved. He must also invest
time and risk his reputation and good will with the local credit
industry. If he receives only a refund of an overcharge or the striking
of a void clause from his contract, he has not been made whole. He
has still lost the amount of his attorney's fee, his time, reputation and
good will. Something more is needed even in the settlement situation,
if the statute is to promote solution of these problems through legal
channels.53 This "something more" should compensate him for both
attorney's fees and time and risk to reputation. Three methods of
providing such an additional award seem possible: (1) an additional
award related to attorney's fees, either "a reasonable attorney's fee"
or a stated dollar amount related to a typical fee for handling such
a problem; (2) cancellation of the interest charge; (3) an option for
the consumer to rescind the contract.5"
52 Of course, some consumers are sufficiently sophisticated to recognize violations
and confront the creditor to seek adjustment. This adjustment may then be negotiated
without regard to the remedy provisions of any statute and to the mutual satisfaction
of the parties. Where they can deal on equal terms, this resolution may be more appro-
priate than any statutory rule; but it is an atypical fact situation.
53 This is not the same measure of damages which would be given by the standard
contract formulation. However, damages established by a statute's regulatory scheme
can be different, and the U3C draftsmen have already recognized the necessity of dif-
fering from the standard formulation by providing recovery of attorney's fees in some
circumstances. UC § 5.201(7).
54 The term "rescind," rather than the UCC term "cancel" is used deliberately
as reflecting more accurately the relief envisaged. Rescission would include return of
both goods and payments, with or without an allowance for use. Since the consumer
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The first method is causally related to part of the necessary
compensation, but compensates him only for the monetary part of
his investment. Setting a standard fee will be difficult, since the
typical fee will be different in urban and rural locations. If a standard
is not set, the creditor amd consumer's attorney may not be able to
agree on a "reasonable" fee without the mediating influence of a
court. Out-of-court settlements can be promoted only if the recovery
amounts are explicit and very certain. The second method is not
causally related to any part of the consumer's investment, but might
compensate him for all facets of his investment in many cases, and
also is certain and easily ascertainable. However, any award relating
to cancellation of an interest charge must provide for a minimum
recovery. Without such a minimum, it is too easy for the seller to
raise his supposed cash price and eliminate interest charges, thus
avoiding the statutory penalty.5 If the minimum is set sufficiently
high to cover a typical attorney's fee, this would seem to combine
the best attributes of the first two methods.
In some circumstances, however, enforcement of the contract,
even with an allowance, is completely inappropriate. Where the,
violation relates to inducing the consumer to contract, such as a false
statement of a contract term or a prohibited referral sale, there is no
relationship between the consumer's loss of expectations and any
monetary award. In many instances it can be presumed that the con-
sumer would not have purchased but for the violation, so that a far
more appropriate remedy would be an option to rescind.5 0 Even
where a monetary award could be appropriate, many aggrieved con-
sumers will not consult an attorney, but will stop making payments-
an inartistic attempted rescission. If the consumer thereby loses all
protection, the statute has not aided him, regardless of the quality
of its regulatory provisions. Thus it is at least arguable that such
conduct should be recognized, and optional rescission allowed for
all violations.57
has had to invest time and money to obtain redress, such an allowance seems Inappro.
priate. A separate problem is created by destruction or damage of the goods sold,
which could prohibit appropriate use of the rescission device.
55 The federal Truth in Lending Act provides an example of how this may be
done. 82 Stat. 146, § 130(a)(1), 1968 United States Code, Cong. and Admin. News 1232,
1245.
56 See note 54 supra.
67 A possible limit on such recognition arises from the fact that some technical
violations, such as a small overcharge, probably will not be discovered by the con-




If the foregoing remedies are necessary to compensate the con-
sumer fully in the out-of-court settlement situation, they are ob-
viously insufficient when litigation is required. The investments of
time and money are greater, but more important a new element is
added-risk. To the layman the risks of litigation are frighteningly
uncertain and create an immense psychological barrier. He must
invest his time and money knowing that his chances of success are
low58 and that he cannot estimate them with any accuracy. He must be
prepared to fight appeals and contend with the best legal counsel.
Mere compensation for expenditures, such as an award of attorney's
fees, cannot therefore realistically compensate, because it ignores the
risk factor. Instead an incentive is needed to induce the consumer to
undertake the risks involved, and an incentive great enough to in-
duce him to undertake test cases to clarify the statute. 9 Such awards
to the successful litigant must be very substantial to create this kind
of incentive, and also to compensate him for both the large expenses
and the risks he must undertake. 6°
Such additional awards will also act as a deterrent. Consumers,
as a group, need such a deterrent capability more than a public
agency, because they have no means of consistently halting or redress-
ing violations. Thus, if they are to supplement the powers of an
under-financed, or perhaps industry dominated, agency, they must
have the power to deter violations. Providing such a deterrent
capability does not necessitate a harsh penalty, such as voiding both
principal and interest, in all cases. Sanctions can be differentiated
depending upon the conduct one seeks to induce or deter.
In particular, the consumer has two identifiable interests which
must be separately recognized. First, he has an interest in inducing
the creditor not to violate the statute. Secondly, after violation, he
has an interest in inducing the creditor to settle, rather than litigate.
Thus, two different levels of deterrents are needed, just as two levels
of redress awards are needed-one applicable to out-of-court settle-
ments, the other to instances in which a violating creditor has com-
pelled the consumer to litigate. Even if large deterrents are available
68 In the area of private antitrust litigation, for example, less than 17 per cent
of plaintiffs are successful. See Alioto, The Economics of A Treble Damage Case, 32
A.B.A. ANrusr L.J. 87, 92 (1966).
59 Such test cases will be highly speculative, but necessary if private enforcement
is to supplement the administrative agency. The agency may be conservative or jealous
of its litigation record and therefore unwiling to attempt test cases.
,6 In antitrust regulation, the successful litigant can obtain treble damages. 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1964). The analogy does not seem apposite in the area of consumer pro-
tection, however, because of the lack of provable commerdal damages.
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in the litigation context, if they are only available then, there is no
deterrent applicable to the act of violating the statute. The violating
creditor could settle the few claims raised by consumers without
liability, which in effect permits violation without risk.01 This
ignores one purpose of such sanctions, and fails to protect an identi-
fiable consumer interest.
On the other hand, failure to differentiate between the awards
available with and without litigation will induce the creditor to
threaten to litigate all complaints. Threats of such conduct, includ-
ing endless appeals, will intimidate many consumers to abandon
their efforts to achieve redress. Thus, serious efforts at settlement will
be implemented by differentiating awards according to the method
of resolution. 62 The difference between the settlement award and the
litigation award is an inducement not to litigate, or a deterrent to
litigation. If a court finds that the creditor has violated the statute,
it must be presumed that the creditor had the power to propose an
out-of-court settlement which offered full redress, as long as the
aggrieved consumer made an attempt to contact the creditor and
settle the grievance before initiating action. Therefore, the only con-
dition to recovery of the larger award, other than successfully prov-
ing the violation, should be a demand by the consumer for redress
and lapse of sufficient reaction time without an offer of full settle-
ment by the creditor.
It is often proposed that such awards be conditioned on proof
of "willful" violations by the creditor,0 3 but the suggestion fails to
perceive the multiple purposes of the awards. For example, large
awards to the successful private litigant are given both to induce him
to undertake the risks and expenses involved and to deter the vio-
lating creditor from requiring him to litigate. The willfulness of the
original violation is therefore irrelevant to granting the award.
Where the creditor settles out of court, it is arguable that willfulness
should be relevant, to penalize only the culpable violator. But it is
also arguable that violations of a consumer protection statute should
provide absolute liability to induce the creditor to establish and
maintain such business practices as may be necessary to prevent in-
advertent violations, especially where the penalty is mild.0 4 However,
if the amount of the award is set to compensate the aggrieved con-
61 See text between notes 39 and 40 supra.
62 On this point, the U3C draftsmen agree in theory. See Comment to § 5201.
63 See U8C § 5.201(6).
64 P_ PERKms, CmMNAL LAw 692-710 (1957).
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sumer for his investment of time, money and reputation in seeking
redress, the award also serves a redress purpose, and willfulness is
again irrelevant to granting an award for such a purpose.
Thus, a dual system of enforcement is proposed. Public enforce-
ment is likely to provide more consistent application of control, but
may not be aggressive, for it may be underfinanced or subject to
bureaucratic conservatism, red tape and inertia or to industry dom-
ination. It therefore should be supplemented by effective private
enforcement which, although applying only randomly, is not subject
to bureaucratic control or lethargy. The public agency should first be
provided a means of informing the creditor as to the validity of
specific courses of proposed conduct, then provided ample means of
preventing or halting violations and redressing and penalizing those
which have occurred. It should have the power to handle each of
these functions informally or formally through agency proceedings or
in court. Several functions should be accomplished in one proceeding
-for example, allowing the agency to condition its acceptance of an
assurance of discontinuance on redress to aggrieved individuals,
seizure of forms with prohibited clauses and establishment of an
escrow fund to redress future violations.
Private individuals should be empowered to bring class actions
to halt violations, within some limitations, and also to seek full
redress. Any award which grants full redress must include compensa-
tion for the consumer's investment of time, money and reputation,
even in achieving an out-of-court settlement, and such an award
would also act as a mild deterrent. If a larger additional deterrent is
desired in more specialized circumstances, it should be provided.
Thus, if a violating creditor refuses to settle, a very substantial award
is needed to induce the consumer to risk litigation. However, the
addition of such larger awards in special circumstances should not
create conditions on the recovery of the basic redress-oriented award.
II. THE STATU
The enforcement provisions of the USC are divided between
two articles, Article 6 on public enforcement and Article 5 on private
enforcement. Each will be discussed in turn. A stated basic assump-
tion of the UBC draftsmen is that the statute should provide "ample
administrative powers and self-executing judicial remedies" to assure
compliance with the statute.65 The intended meaning of the refer-
ence to administrative powers is clear, and the draftsmen have
65 Prefatory Note, USC at 3.
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concentrated on this aspect of enforcement. However, the intended
meaning of the reference to "self-executing judicial remedies" is
less clear. It seems to refer to remedies available to the consumer
without agency intervention, but does it refer only to remedies
available without resort to courts? If the latter is intended, it is an
illusory exercise, because judicial recognition of the individual's
rights will usually be needed to protect them fully.
A. Public Enforcement Under the U3C
The USC grants broad powers to an "Administrator," but does
not seem to grant him the power to issue declaratory orders. He may
promulgate substantive rules "in cases specifically authorized by
this Act,"6' 6 but these are intended to be only general regulations,
not responses to specific inquiries. He may also "counsel persons and
groups on their rights and duties under this Act,"07 but such counsel
does not seem appealable if adverse, so the creditor must violate the
advice to test it. If favorable, the informal "counsel" cannot be relied
upon because it provides no protection from subsequent action by
the Administrator. Thus, there is no method provided under the
U3C to inform creditors whether a proposed course of specific con-
duct violates the statute.
General regulations may be issued, and do provide protection
for all conduct conforming to a then-existing rule or guideline. 8
Such regulations may be amended, rescinded or invalidated by the
Administrator or a court,6 9 so that the creditor has no vested right
in retaining a regulation once he has set his business practices,70 but
a subsequent change has no effect on prior creditor conduct. While
the rule or guideline is in force, the creditor is protected from all
liability for conforming conduct. Although this seems sound for
liability through public enforcement, it improperly limits actions by
individual consumers and subverts private enforcement. The "no
liability" rule precludes any award to the successful consumer liti-
gant, even to reimburse him for attorney's fees actually expended,
and thereby destroys all incentive to bring private actions against
66 U3C § 6.104(1)(f). Such power is specifically provided in only three instances:
adjustment of dollar amounts, additional charges, and advertising. USC §§ 1.106, 2.202,
2.303.
67 U3C § 6.104(l)(b).
68 USC § 6.104(2).
69 USC §§ 6.l04(1)(0f, 6.108(2).
70 There seems to be no requirement of notice before change of regulations so the
creditor does not even have this interest.
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creditors to test agency regulations. 1 Nor does the USC provide any
method for consumers to test such regulations before the agency
itself. Thus, if industry domination exists, the "no liability" rule will
help sustain it.
Instead of providing such information to creditors, the U3C
draftsmen have concentrated on halting prohibited conduct only
after a course of dealing which violates the statute has started, and
then preventing such conduct from recurring. Article 6 provides for
informal handling through assurances of discontinuance, for agency
proceedings leading to a judicially reviewable cease and desist order,
and for direct application to the courts for injunctions. Thus the
necessary types of enforcement devices have been provided, but
there are problems in the scope and structure of the devices set forth
in the UG.
The Administrator is allowed to deal with violators informally
and accept an assurance of discontinuance from them.7-2 This might
have provided the Administrator a very useful enforcement tool,
except that it seems to be usable only in very limited situations. The
present draft allows its use only to process "conduct subject to an
order by the Administrator (Section 6.108) or a court (Sections 6.110
through 6.112)."'  This language might be interpreted to include
all violations against which either might act; however, since the lan-
guage is not conditional, it literally seems applicable only to those
prior violations which have been the subject of actual orders directed
to the particular creditor. If the latter interpretation prevails, assur-
ances may not be used to handle claimed violations of the statute,
but only claimed violations of an Administrator's order or a court
order. Thus it may not be used to process the initial violations of
the statute by a particular creditor, where an informal procedure
would be the most useful tool to inform him of the violation and im-
pose a mild sanction. Instead, it could only be used to process later
violations, occurring after a formal proceeding, and when the
creditor should be aware of the questionable nature of his conduct.
This limitation requires the Administrator to handle all first viola-
tions through formal proceedings-a needless escalation of the con-
flict in many cases-or take no official action.
71 The analytical problems presented seem quite similar to those concerning the
requirement of "willfulness" for a supposedly-deterrent penalty awrard, which is also
needed to afford complete redress to the consumer.
•2 USC § 6.109.
73 Id.
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If an assurance is given and the creditor continues his violations,
the prior assurance "is evidence" that violations occurred before the
assurance.74 This seems to be the only effect under the USC of
breaching an assurance. There is no express authority to condition
acceptance on redress to aggrieved consumers, reimbursement to the
agency for investigation costs or establishment oF an escrow fund to
redress future violations.75 Since the assurance evidences prior viola-
tions, it probably cannot be worded to cover more than those viola-
tions which the Administrator is willing to attempt to prove have
actually occurred in the past.70 Thus the violator can change his pro-
hibited practices slightly and escape the scope of the assurance. In
order to use the assurance as "evidence" of prior violations, the
Administrator seemingly must first prove that the assurance itself
has been breached, which requires that he first prove the occurrence
of the subsequent violations. Of what value, then, is the assurance?
The multiple conditions on its use in court make the USG's assur-
ance of discontinuance an illusory regulatory tool.
Formal agency proceedings are also available, on the Admin-
istrator's initiative,77 except against unconscionable contracts or col-
lection tactics. 78 The reason for this exclusion is obscure, for the
agency expertise would seem most useful in defining or analyzing
these abstract concepts.70 For other violations, the Administrator
may, after a hearing, issue a cease and desist order, which is subject
to judicial review upon appeal by the creditor.80 The Admin-
istrator's orders are not self-executing, so he must seek a court order
for enforcement. His findings of fact may be reversed only if clearly
erroneous, and creditors' objections not urged at the administrative
hearing are deemed waived unless excused for good cause.81 If the
74 Id., second sentence.
75 See text at notes 27-30 supra.
70 Compare the problems created by the scope of a cease and desist order. See
note 37 supra. The problem is even more easily solved in the assurance of discon-
tinuance context, because the admissions may be stated separately from the assurance.
See text at note 27 supra. By providing for admissions, some of the problems discussed
in text following this footnote may be obviated.
77 U3C § 6.108.
78 U3C § 6.108(6). See note 91 infra.
79 If it is felt that the defining of "unconscionability" should be controlled by the
courts, all agency decisions are reviewable. U3C § 6.108(1). Thus the exclusion can be
supported only by asserting that the courts must have the exclusive opportunity to
develop a definition. However, such an assertion ignores the primary rationale for
providing expert administrative bodies.
so u3c § 6.108(1).
81 U3C § 6.108(2), (8).
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creditor does not appeal within thirty days, the Administrator may
procure a court order for enforcement by petitioning the court and
showing service of the agency order on the creditor and that he is
subject to the jurisdiction of the court.8 2 The statute does not state
whether the court must issue such an enforcement order, nor whether
defenses may be interposed at this point by the creditor. At least,
however, the agency order is now "final," and the Administrator
need not "support its findings with substantial evidence."83
The primary problem created by these agency hearings is the
scope of the orders provided. The cease and desist order concerns
only the halting of presently-occurring violations.8 4 It cannot redress
aggrieved individuals, reimburse the agency, or prevent future or
penalize past violations. The same is also true for the resulting court
enforcement orders, for according to the statute the court may grant
only a restraining order through the Administrator's petition.85
The Administrator also has direct access to the courts, on his
own initiative, to seek a temporary or permanent injunction (but not
a temporary restraining order) to halt violations of the Act.88 Tem-
porary relief is available only after notice and a hearing, no matter
how dear the violation, nor how convincing the evidence, nor how
heinous the violation, nor how numerous the potential victims.8 7 The
matter does not even seem to be within the discretion of the court ss
Thus, speedy relief may not be available when needed. This seems
an unwarranted interference with the normal discretionary powers
of an equity court."' On the bther hand, in most cases, relief may
be granted to prevent violations before they occur, because it need
not be shown that violations have actually occurred to obtain such
82 UsC § 6.108(5).
83 U3C § 6.108, comment.
84 USC § 6.108(1).
85 U3C § 6.108(2).
86 USC §§ 6.110-.112.
87 U3C § 6.112.
88 The section states that "the Administrator may apply to the court for appro-
priate temporary relief," which would normally include temporary restraining orders.
However, it then states the limitation "but only after a hearing." Since this language
limits the Administrator's authority to apply to the court, it deprives him of standing
to seek an order. Id.
89 Ordinarily a temporary restraining order is available when in the court's dis-
cretion special circumstances of need make that very special relief proper. See 7 J.
MooRE, F rn.L Pi.Acrica 65.05-.07 (2d ed. 1955); Inhabitants of Town of Lincoln-
ville v. Perry, 150 Me. 113, 116-17, 104 A.2d 884, 887 (1954).
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an order." Thus, if the Administrator can obtain warning of po-
tential violations and can prove "reasonable cause to believe" that
they are planned, he may be able to forestall them. As usual, there is
an exception to this rule concerning unconscionable agreements, for
which proof of past violations is a requisite to any relief.01
If the Administrator has powers to stop violations through
several devices, his ability to obtain redress is much more limited.
He may not be able to obtain such redress at all, except for usury
violations. The only provision which expressly allows him to seek
such redress for aggrieved individuals enables him to demand
"refunds" of "overcharges" (what once was called usury), and to
penalize refusals to accede to such demands.0 2 For all other viola-
tions, he has no express power to seek redress. However, if he brings
a formal court action seeking to enjoin a creditor's conduct, he may
also seek "other appropriate relief. '0 3 He faces two hurdles in seeking
to use this phrase to obtain redress for individual consumers: First,
what is "appropriate relief?" And second, has he standing to represent
aggrieved consumers as a class? Redress under this phrase seems more
plausible where the violation concerns the inclusion of void clauses,
and the court is asked to enjoin the creditor from enforcing them.
Thus the relief sought is still injunctive, but of broader scope; and
the state is sometimes allowed to seek injunctive relief when repre-
senting private rights of action.94
90 USC §§ 6.110-.112. Under USC § 6.110, he may seek to restrain a creditor "from
violating" the Act, and is not limited to enjoining them from continuing to violate,
Under U3C § 6.111, he may likewise seek to restrain creditors "from engaging" In
prohibited courses of conduct.
91 USC § 6.111(2)(a). However, the court may restrain "unconscionable conduct"
if it finds that the creditor "is likely to engage" in a course of such conduct.
An explanation for the many exceptions to the normal rules regarding uncon-
scionable agreements and collection techniques is that the USC draftsmen seem un-
decided about whether to call them violations of the Act or not. They do not appear
in those parts of the USC which create all other violations, but sanctions arc provided
against them. Further, the aggrieved consumer may not obtain relief, but the Admin-
istrator may. See text at notes 105-09 infra. These are strange results, and differences
which do not seem to be based on any analytical distinctions. Until tie draftsmen
decide whether such conduct actually is to be prohibited, such anomalies will continue,
92 U3C § 6.113(l).
93 U3C § 6.110.
94 The issue of agency protection of the defrauded public by means of the In-
junctive process is not free from problems. It has been held that the state could not
be granted a decree enjoining violations of the usury laws where it was not proved
that victims of the practice were indigent or for other reasons unable to protect them-
selves, Nash v. State, 271 Ala. 173, 128 So. 2d 24 (1960), and that the state solicitor
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However, where the violation requires a more sophisticated
remedy, such as an election to rescind, the utility of this provision
would depend upon local procedural rules concerning public repre-
sentation of private rights of action in non-injunctive proceedings.9 5
As long as the Administrator cannot bring a class action representing
consumers, and the UBG gives him no such powers, he probably
cannot obtain such rescission or reformation of contracts to which he
is not a party. Thus, in many jurisdictions he may be unable to help
the consumers aggrieved through the use of balloon notes, referral
sales, or unauthorized home solicitation sale techniques.9 Further,
he has no ability to obtain any redress for unconscionable contracts
or collection techniques, because injunctions against such practices
are provided in a separate section which does not allow the court
to grant "other appropriate relief."0 7 Thus the Administrator lit-
erally cannot help the individual consumer who has been harassed
by all-night telephone calls. As to reimbursement for his own costs
general was not the proper party to seek such an injunction where the duty to see
that state laws are enforced was expressly vested in the governor. State ex rel. Boykin
v. Ball Investment Co., 191 Ga. 382, 12 S.E.2d 574 (1940). See generally, Annot. 83
A.LR.2d 848 (1962).
This analytical problem is compounded by the conflicting principles in the ad-
ministrative law area that a delegation of power carries with it the implied powers
necessary to perform the designated duty and that any delegation of authority to an
administrator must be strictly construed to prevent overreaching. Compare discussion
in United States v. Jones, 204 F.2d 745, 750-54 (7th Cir. 1953) with statement in United
States v. Foster, 131 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1942) that "while officers are presumed to have
acted within their authority, statutes delegating powers to public officers must be strictly
construed. .. '
95 The problem here is that statutes providing for private redress through public
prosecution are read narrowly. See, e.g., Railroad Commissioners v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 56 Fla. 525, 47 So. 870 (1908). (The Railroad Commissioner was authorized to
bring a restitutional suit at request and on behalf of a private party, but his authority
was read to be limited to bringing suit only in those situations peculiarly related to
the duty of a common carrier). See note 94 supra.
96 These problems may represent one difficulty with what the draftsmen term
"self-executing remedies." U3C § 2.405 gives the balloon note victim a right to re-
finance. Even if this were an appropriate remedy (see text following note 144 infra)
a court order may be needed to obtain the refinancing from a creditor who would
violate the clear provisions of the statutory section. If the Administrator may not seek
such an order, and the consumer can obtain no award from the creditor for the viola-
tion, there is no risk in a violation. A court order is even more necessary where the
violation involves an unauthorized home solicitation sale, because of the evidentiary
problems involved, and the fact that an ineffectual cancellation is a default. As to
referral sales, see Part II, C, infra.
97 USC § 6.111. See note 91 supra.
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of investigation and prosecution of the violating creditor, the USC
gives the Administrator no powers of redress. Thus, such costs must
be borne by the public at large, rather than by the creditor who
caused the expenditures by his own illegal acts.
If halting violations after they begin may be delayed, and re-
dress for past violations may be unavailable, can the Administrator
deter potential violations before they begin? Since the U3C does not
provide for declaratory orders, so that creditors cannot determine in
advance whether a proposed course of conduct will be considered a
violation, the deterrent function is not emphasized. The Adminis-
trator is given two types of civil actions to recover a penalty: one for
usury violations, the other for almost all types of violations. A usurer
is subject to a penalty only if he refuses to refund upon demand,9 8
or has deliberately violated the act.99 The first action is designed only
to deter litigation, since the violating creditor can escape the penalty
by settling. The second action would seem practically unavailable
because of the impossibility of proving the requisite intent, except
for the self-confessed loan shark. Thus there is no penalty attaching
to the simple act of charging usurious rates from time to time, not
even a slight one.100 The creditor literally risks nothing by such
conduct.
A separate cause of action is given the Administrator to recover
a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars for any "repeated and
willful" violation of the Act,' 0 ' except the making of unconscionable
contracts or use of unconscionable debt collection tactics.1 02 Since the
violations must be both repeated and willful, proof of a number of
violations is probably insufficient. Instead, the Administrator seem-
ingly must prove that the creditor has engaged in a "practice" of
"knowingly" violating the statute.0 3 In all cases, the intent require-
ment creates fact issues, and thereby reduces the effectiveness of the
98 U3C § 6.113(1).
09 U3C § 6.113(2). The penalty may be assessed if the excess charge was "in de-
liberate violation or in reckless disregard of" the Act. However, no penalty may be
levied if the violation was "unintentional." U3C § 6.113(4). This seems to create a
conflict as to reckless, but unintentional, conduct.
100 The only sanction attaching to "getting caught" at such a violation is that the
overcharge must be refunded. U3C § 6.113(1). lBut the money refunded is all illegal
profit anyway, so the creditor has at this time risked none of the funds to which he
had a rightful claim.
101 U3C § 6.113(3), (4). Presumably, this sanction is available against usurcrs too,
U3C § 6.113, comment.
102 See note 91 supra.
103 U3C § 6.113, comment.
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deterrent because of the uncertainty of the result of the litigation.
It also allows the creditor to be extremely careless in his observation
of the regulatory provisions without risk. Whenever the statutory
meaning is unclear or subject to several interpretations, the creditor
may automatically opt for the most favorable meaning without
risk. 04
Even the dedicated, well-financed, "ombudsman-type" Admin-
istrator will have problems with this set of enforcement tools. Every
action is excessively formalized. If he seeks to halt violations after
they have occurred, at least formal agency proceedings are necessi-
tated. If he seeks to prevent or deter their occurrence, or to redress
the effect of past violations, he must proceed in court. As to providing
redress to aggrieved consumers, this requirement virtually eliminates
the effectiveness of the Administrator in providing consistent and
comprehensive relief. On the other hand, the unaggressive or under-
financed civil servant can easily go through the motions without
accomplishing anything. He can issue cease and desist orders when-
ever he happens upon a violation and accept assurances of discon-
tinuance for later violations; believing in good faith that some day,
before the statute of limitations runs, an assistant attorney general
will appear and bring all the appropriate actions for all the viola-
tions in his files. The latter type of Administrator creates an im-
mediate need for effective private enforcement, and in particular
for effective provisions for redress to the aggrieved individual. Does
Article 5 of the U3C so provide?
B. Private Enforcement Under the U3C
In one of the most crucial areas, the U3C gives the consumer
no powers to do anything-to halt, deter or seek redress for viola-
tions. Unconscionable debt collection practices are supposedly regu-
lated by the USC, but they are not expressly prohibited or declared
104 The provision, and the problems it creates, illustrate another reason for autho-
rizing the issuance of declaratory orders.
Criminal penalty provisions are provided, but only for violations concerning mis.
disclosure, usury, the unlicensed making of regulated loans, and non-notification to
the administrator of engaging in consumer financing. USC §§ 5.301-.02. No criminal
penalties are provided which apply to any other violations of the act, no matter how
heinous. The draftsmen may have underrated the effect of such sanctions, even if
prosecutions are not brought. See note 43 supra. License revocations are also posible
if the violating creditor is authorized to make "regulated loas." USC § 3.504. The
criterion for revocation is the same as that for imposing a civil penalty. Compare USC
§ 3.504(l)(a) with U3C § 6.113(3). Thus it possesses the same faults.
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a violation.0 5 Thus, the consumer has no right of action under the
statute against the creditor who uses such tactics. Even though a
remedy for such unconscionable conduct is developing in tort,100 the
U3C provides that the creditor's rights on the contract may not be
impaired by such conduct.10 7 The broad language of the U3C may
even jeopardize the development of the tort action, because the U3C
expressly undertakes to regulate such conduct and refuses the debtor
a remedy. 08 Has it preempted the field? 00 There is no reason either
to deny the consumer a remedy through private action, or to create
doubts concerning the validity of the developing tort remedy. The
aggrieved consumer is being directly affected by the conduct, and he
should therefore be able to act on his own initiative, without regard
to the Administrator's finances or philosophy. The draftsmen of a
modem consumer protection statute should recognize the modern
tort developments and incorporate them into the UC.
As to the halting of violations, the consumer has no express
power to seek injunctions under the USC, so that he will have diffi-
culties attempting to halt them, even through a class action. The
difficulties arise because the relief is too limited if the class comprises
only past victims, but potential victims as a class may not yet have
standing to sue.110 Thus the statute would have to expressly grant
105 USC § 6.111. Unconscionable agreements and clauses also are not labelled as
violations, but courts are permitted to refuse to enforce them, regardless of the parties
to the action. USC § 5.106. Presumably, such language will create a right of action in
equity for reformation in most states. See text at note 133 infra.
106 Three principles currently being used in the abusive debt collection technique
area are: the right of privacy, Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d
321 (1961); the intentional infliction of emotional distress, Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co.,
246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154 (1963); and unreasonable collection practices, Signature
Indorsement Co. v. Wilson, 392 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See Note, Mental
Distress From Collection Activities, 17 HASTINGs L.J. 369 (1965); Comment, Effectively
Regulating Extra-Judicial Collection of Debts, 20 ME. L. Rxv. 261 (1968), Comment,
Collection Capers: Liability for Debt Collection Practices, 24 U. Ciah L. REy, 572 (1957).
107 U3C § 5.201(1).
108 The counter argument is that the U3C seeks only to regulate contract rem-
edies, not those for breach of common law duties. However, the USC ignores standard
contract measures of damage throughout.
109 Cf., e.g., Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 240.52, 218
N.E.2d 185, 194-201 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
110 While a victim should be allowed to seek an injunction against a prohibited
course of conduct, an as yet uninjured member of the consuming public would not
be permitted to sue for failure to show the requisite special injury different from that
suffered by the general public. See, e.g., G. T. McGovern Trucking Co. v. Moses,
92 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
It is even questionable whether a private consumer could, under the UBC, obtain
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standing to seek an injunction, and it does not. If the consumer is to
have any ability to prevent violations, it must therefore come through
the technique of deterring future violations by penalizing such con-
duct after it has occurred.
For most violations of the act, the U8C provides no potential
deterrent through private actions, because the aggrieved consumer
may not recover any penalty award. Penalties are available only
where the violation concerns usury, misdisclosure, referral sales,
regulated loan payments schedules, or the making of regulated loans
without a license."' There are no penalties, as such, attached to
such other violations as use of negotiable promissory notes, balloon
notes and clauses assigning earnings, confessing judgment, waiving
defenses, providing unreasonable attorneys fees and default charges,
and unconscionable debt collection techniques."- Thus neither an
individual consumer, nor any conscientious group of consumers,
can even attempt to deter such conduct through private enforcement.
Even if void, their in terrorem use is a major abuse, and consumers
should be able to deter it on their own initiative.
Even in cases of usury, the deterrent effect available through
private action is nonexistent. No penalty is available if the creditor
refunds the usurious charge upon demand."8 The creditor must not
only violate the statute, but also refuse redress in order to be
penalized. Therefore, the penalty does not seek to deter the viola-
tion itself, but only the refusal to furnish redress after violation.11 4
This is the only section which seeks to deter litigation; all other sec-
tions provide no additional award if the creditor compels the con-
sumer to undertake its hazards.
Most of the penalties which are provided are related to a
cancellation of "loan finance charge" or the "credit service charge"
injunctive relief since that function is expressly vested in the Administrator (USC
§ 6.110) and where the legislature has designated certain parties to perform a certain
function, parties not included may be deemed excluded. Cf. New York Post Corp. V.
Moses, 10 N.Y.2d 199, 176 N.E.2d 709 (1961). See notes 49 supra, and 133 infra.
111 USC §§ 5.201(2)-(5), 5.202(1).
112 USC §§ 2A03-.415, 3A02-.407, 3.512, 3.604, 6.111. The USC does in some cases
provide some relief for such violations, but the creditor never is required to give up
more than his ill-gotten gains in such circumstances. See text at notes 52ff. supra and
at notes 127ff. infra.
113 USC § 5.201(3). There is a penalty available if the violation was "deliberate,"
even if the overcharge is refunded upon demand. However, the burden of proof of the
mens rea would seem to be on the consumer, which effectively eliminates the utility
of the exception in practice. Compare § 5.201(6).
114 See text following note 57 supra.
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(both of which are hereafter called "interest").115 The penalties avail-
able for violations of referral sales and regulated loan schedules are
so highly conditioned that they are probably not effective either.
The penalty available is the cancellation of the interest charge. 110
This penalty is available whether the matter is settled out of court
or litigated. Thus there is no inducement to the creditor to settle
out of court rather than to threaten litigation and hope the con-
sumer will not accept the risks it entails. However, the award, in all
cases, is conditioned upon a finding that the creditor's violation was
intentional. 117 It therefore does not provide absolute liability, and
does not seek to deter careless violations. 18 Even the deterrent to
the culpable violator is probably ineffective. The award is con-
ditioned on intent and the presence of an interest charge which is
clearly identifiable as such." 9 With these conditions upon its avail-
ability, it is very unlikely that the penalty will be available in any
practical sense without litigation.120 But the award provided is
probably too small to induce a consumer to undertake the risks and
expenses of litigation, especially if appeals are possible.
The remedies provided for misdisclosure are the same as in the
115 The linguistic distinctions between "loan finance charge" and "credit service
charge" in current use are due to the time-price doctrine and are conceptually dif.
ficult to rationalize. An attack upon so ancient a concept as the time-price doctrine Is
outside the scope of this article. The distinction between the credit sale and cash loan
will probably continue to be made, but only because of policy reasons based on the
modern economics of consumer credit, and the requirements of usury statutes adopted
without such economics in mind. Therefore, because this article is concerned with the
enforceability of any type of provision limiting rates of return on loans, the circum-
locutions of the doctrine will be ignored, as will distinctions based solely on the status
of the creditor as a lender or a merchant. See Hare v. General Contract Purchase
Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952); Littlefield, Parties and Transactions Covered
by Consumer-Credit Legislation, 8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 463 (1967).
116 USC § 5.201(4).
117 U3C § 5.201(6). Although the statute is much more circumloquacious, through
assigning the burden of proof on the issue to the creditor, the result is the same. The
statute requires the court to decide whether the violation was intentional or not, and
only if this question is decided in the debtor's favor is the added sanction available,
118 See text at note 64 supra.
119 The effect of this condition on the award in referral sale violation is remark.
able. See text at notes 143-44 infra.
120 It would be extremely unwise for the consumer even merely to stop payment
of interest without the protection of a court order or a written release by the creditor.
No matter how obvious the violation, it could always be claimed to be unintentional,
freeing the creditor from liability for the penalty and automatically placing the un-
protected consumer in default on his obligation. This will be very tricky for the lay-
man unless guided by counsel at every step.
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federal Truth in Lending Act.12' They provide a slightly greater
penalty award, twice the interest charges, up to one thousand dol-
Jars. Further, there is a minimum liability of one hundred dollars,
regardless of the amount of interest. The award is more certain
than others provided by the UMG. It is mandatory for all misdisdo-
sure violations, if made "knowingly." There is a presumption that
any violation was made knowingly, and the creditor must prove not
only that the misdisclosure was the result of a bona fide error but
also that he maintained procedures which were reasonably adapted
to avoid such an error.122
The only violation for which both principal and interest may
be cancelled is the making of "regulated loans" without a licenseY
However, this penalty also seems illusory. The distinction between
regulated loans and others is the greater interest rate allowed the
regulated lender-he may charge more than 10 per cent per year.
Therefore, the creditor who charges more than that may claim that
he is merely a usurer, not an unlicensed regulated lender, and that
he is liable for no more than the lesser usury penalties.
Thus the consumer probably has no effective deterrent powers
against afiy volations of his statutory rights. For most violations he
simply is given no deterrent power by the statute. Against two viola-
tions, usury and unlicensed regulated lending, the express deterrent
provided seems illusory. While the deterrent available against re-
ferral sales and unauthorized schedules in regulated loans is not
entirely illusory, it is so small, and so highly qualified, that it is un-
likely to be available in practice. The deterrent available against
misdisclosure is also subject to the same objections, but to a lesser
extent. However, in the last case, the remedial provisions in the
U3C have been literally forced upon the draftsmen by Congress.125
If the consumer cannot stop the recurrence of violations, and
cannot deter their occurrence, can he at least obtain redress when
he discovers that his rights have been violated? This question is
of crucial importance, since the Administrator himself probably
cannot obtain such redress in many instances. The answer to this
121 Compare 82 Stat. 146, § 130(a)(1), 1968 United States Code, Cong. and Admin.
News 1232, 1245 with USC § 5.202(l). The amount of the award is the same whether
litigation is required or not, so that there is no deterrent to the creditor refusing to
negotiate.
122 U3C § 5.202(2).
12 uc § 5.201(5).
124 U3C §§ 3.201, 3.501.
125 See note 121 supra.
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question depends upon what one considers to be "redress" when the
consumer's rights have been violated. If redress is considered to be
the refunding of a usurious charge or the striking of a prohibited
clause from the contract, it is sometimes available. However, if re-
dress is considered also to include compensation for the consumer's
investment of his time, money and reputation, this is not available
under the UMC. Attorney's fees may be awarded, at the court's dis-
cretion, 12 but this does not compensate for other investments. Nor
does reimbursement for actual expenditures, if successful, provide
an incentive to undertake the risks of litigation. Further, the at-
torney's fees are reimbursed only when litigation is required.127 Thus
there is no inducement to the consumer to seek counsel when at-
tempting to settle out of court, so that he will probably exercise un-
authorized self-help and create all the problems caused thereby.
Article 5 therefore ignores a prominent known problem.128
If the consumer is not afforded redress in the sense of full
compensation, he should at least be given relief from the injurious
effects of the creditor's violation. Under the UrC, however, such
relief is not always available. It sometimes allows only the Ad-
ministrator to act against wrongful conduct, and then fails to provide
him the power to obtain any compensation for the aggrieved con-
sumer.129 In other circumstances, the relief which is provided is com-
pletely irrelevant to the injury caused by the creditor's violation.
The relief provided by the U3C may conveniently be divided into
four categories: (1) refund of a usurious charge,1 0 which seems ap-
propriate if full redress is not to be provided; (2) a right to cancel
the contract,8 1 which also seems appropriate; (3) a statutory pro-
hibition against certain devices, sometimes with a declaration that
128 U3C § 5.201(7). Attorney's fees "may" be granted by the court, not "shall" be
granted, but no standards are set to guide the court's discretion.
127 Id. The consumer has a right to such fees only if they arc awarded by a
court, presupposing a litigation context.
128 It has been suggested to the draftsmen that the entire statutory scheme will
not provide protection to poor consumers unless a default after a creditor violation is
recognized at least to the extent of not depriving the defaulting consumer of all rights
under the contract. NATL LEGAL Am AND DEFENDER ASS'N, JoINT STATEMENT OF NLDA
AND OEO LEGAL SERviCEs PRoGRAm RE WORKING, DRAFr No. 6 or UCCO, at 4 (Jan-
uary 10, 1968). This author cannot, however, find any attempt in the USC to deal
with this problem.
129 For such wrongs, the consumer must rely upon a non-statutory tort cause of
action. See text at notes 98 and 107-110 supra.
ISO U3C § 5.201(2).
181 USC § 2.502.
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the device is void if used, which is rarely appropriate; and (4)
cancellation of the interest charge, which is rarely appropriate where
used.
The statute's major reliance is on the third method of relief
listed; prohibition and voiding of devices which have been abused
by creditors in the past. This relief is provided for wage assignments,
confession of judgment clauses, clauses providing for unreasonable
attorney's fees and default charges, encumbrance of all the con-
sumer's property, waivers of defenses (one alternative only), and
promissory notes (no voiding, however).132 The limitations on the
value of such relief where third parties are involved should be
obvious. For example: (1) The holder of the promissory note must
still be paid, greatly reducing the consumer's negotiating position
with a defaulting seller. (2) The consumer must still explain to his
employer that the wage assignment is unenforceable, or more likely
procure a court order protecting the employer so as not to jeopardize
his job.
Even where only two parties are involved, the value of the relief
is questionable. Although many of the devices are termed void, this
will not defeat their in terrorem use. What is appropriate relief to
the consumer when a creditor asserts a right to collateral under a
void contract clause? Some form of court action is required, probably
a declaratory judgment and a restraining order against enforcing the
clause. Thus the statute should provide, not only for such an action,
but also for reimbursement to him for his litigation risks and ex-
penses. The U3G does not expressly provide for such an action, al-
though courts will probably create one through normal equity
powers.133 The statute does provide for discretionary recovery of
reasonable attorney's fees, in litigation only, "in any case in which
it is found that a creditor is liable for a violation of this act."' 3 4 How-
ever, since no express right of action is conferred on the consumer
aggrieved by a prohibited contract clause, and therefore no express
creditor liability is created, he may have no right to reimbursement
for such fees, even if he must litigate to achieve redress. His right to
reimbursement depends upon the construction of "liable for a viola-
132 USC §§ 2A03-.415, 3A02-A07, 3.512, 3.604.
133 Drafting history could be dangerous here. Working Draft No. 4 provided an
express right of action against all violations, USC (Working Draft No. 4, 1967) § 5.201(3).
This has since been eliminated. Does this elimination create an argument that these
violations are only matters of defense, and not proper subjects of declaratory judg-
ment actions or actions to reform contracts?
134 U3C § 5.201).
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tion of this act." It may refer to all violations for which a court will
order relief, or it may only refer to those violations which create
express liability under the statute. The latter construction limits
recovery to the five violations specified in U3C sections 5.201 and
5.202. In any case, the statute should not be so unclear as to require
subsequent litigation over the recovery of earlier litigation expenses.
Cancellation of interest charges is inappropriate as the sole
relief for unconscionable debt collection techniques, because in-
juries can vary from nominal to extremely severe. For such viola-
tions, tort damages are the only measure which can provide appro-
priate compensation for the injuries received. Another situation in
which cancellation of interest is inappropriate is when the violation
concerns an inducement to the consumer to contract. In such cir-
cumstances, rescission seems more appropriate to protect the con-
sumer's expectations.
C. An Illustration of the U3C in Operation
Let us take, as a possible example of the effectiveness of the
U3C's enforcement provisions, the referral sale transaction in which
a discount is offered if referrals subsequently buy from seller. The
draftsmen attempted to abolish this device, expressly stating that no
one may offer to make such a sale.185 But suppose someone does, what
can anyone do about it?
The Administrator may seek to prevent this course of dealing,
or to halt it once it has begun. He may approach the problem either
through a cease and desist order or a civil action for an injunc-
tion. Both approaches are formal and eventually depend upon court
orders, so that notice and hearing are prerequisites to any perma-
nent relief. Even temporary relief is greatly delayed, regardless of
the circumstances. The U3C makes notice and hearing mandatory
before issuance of a temporary restraining order, in contrast to nor-
mal equity practice. The length of notice required is not specified,
but he may not seek court enforcement of cease and desist orders
until 30 days after the agency hearing and the issuance of the agency
order. Thus delays may be lengthy indeed, making agency proceed-
ings unsuitable for the mass violation situation. The scope of the
order provided through the agency proceeding also seems limited,
since it can prohibit only past practices and may not apply to sim-
ilar, but slightly different, violations.
No informal method of handling such violations is expressly
135 USC § 2.411.
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authorized. Thus the halting of each violation requires large ex-
penditures of resources, especially attorney's time. Nor is the Ad-
ministrator reimbursed for any of these expenditures, as such, even
when the creditor is proved to have violated the statute.
If the Administrator cannot quickly halt violations of the stat-
ute, he must rely heavily on his ability to deter them through pen-
alties. However, in order to recover any deterrent penalty under
the U3C, he must prove that the creditor willfully and repeatedly
violated the statute.13 6 Proof of several violations may be insufficient,
because of the willfulness requirement; and proof of a consistent
course of dealing may be required, according to the Comment.' m
Thus, the creditor who is careful enough to make such sales only
from time to time is arguably not subject to any penalty. In prac-
tice, this would require the Administrator to allow many violations
to occur, establishing a practice, before he would consider his evi-
dence sufficient to seek a'penalty. Such a deterrent provision is of
little practical utility, because the Administrator should not be will-
ing to delay prosecution until such a practice is established.
The Administrator is especially unlikely to wait as violations
occur when he knows that he is powerless to provide any redress to
aggrieved individuals under the U3M. There is no express author-
ity for him to bring an action to seek such redress, or even to nego-
tiate with the creditor on behalf of the aggrieved consumer. The
only possible avenue for attempting redress is UC section 6.110
which permits an action for an injunction "and other appropriate
relief." Even if he can persuade a court that redress to aggrieved
consumers would be an appropriate relief, he probably still cannot
succeed. The court cannot impair the creditor's contract rights ex-
cept as "otherwise provided" by the statute. 38 The only such pro-
vision creates a right of action in the consumer to cancel the con-
tractual interest charge. 3 9 But the statute gives the Administrator
no standing to represent consumers, even in a class action for re-
dress; so he may not have standing to seek such cancellations, and
therefore no ability to obtain any redress for individuals.
The consumer's rights to enforce the statute are even more
limited. He has no power to seek to enjoin the violations. Instead,
the statutory remedy provided him for all purposes is the cancella-
136 U3C § 6.113(3).
137 U3C § 6.113, comment.
138 USC § 5-201(l).
139 USC § 5.201(4).
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tion of the interest charge.140 However, the consumer would be well-
advised to obtain either a court order or a written release admitting
the intentional nature of the violation before failing to pay interest.
Otherwise, he may be in default if a court later finds that the vio-
lation was unintentional.141 This requires an investment in legal
fees, with or without litigation; and the resulting award seems in-
sufficient to induce the undertaking of such expenses when coupled
with the risks of litigation.142
Further, a creditor who wishes to avoid private actions, and
any redress, may easily do so by simply raising his cash price and
eliminating the express interest charge. The remedy available would
then be the striking of the conditional discount provisions from the
contract, leaving the remainder of the contract enforceable without
impairment,143 including the original sale price. This seems a strange
result, and indicates that the draftsmen have not yet thought the
problem through. One solution to this problem is to provide a mini-
mum recovery, as in the federal Truth in Lending Act.144
However, the minimum recovery does not solve the deeper
problems created by the inappropriate relation of the injuries to
the cancellation of the interest charge. The referral sale is prohib-
ited because of its capacity to defraud the consumer by inducing
unwarranted expectations of large discounts which will usually not
be realized. There is no necessary relationship between these asserted
discounts and the interest charge, so that there is no relation be-
tween the consumer's loss of expectations and the damages provided
by the statute. It can usually be presumed that the consumer would
not have purchased from the particular seller without the supposed
discounts, so the appropriate remedy to protect his expectations is
rescission. Further, this remedy is appropriate whenever the viola-
tion concerns a prohibited inducement to form the contract, such
as misrepresentation of the cash price, interest rate or payment sched-
ule, including the use of the balloon note.145
140 Id.
141 U3C § 5.201(6)(b). See text at notes 63-64 supra.
142 See text at notes 58-60 supra.
143 U3C § 5.201(1).
144 See note 121 supra.
145 Contrast the remedy available under USC § 2.405, which provides mandatory
refinancing of a balloon payment. The remedy assumes that the consumer desires to
refinance, which may not in fact be correct if he was induced to contract because low
weekly payments were quoted and were available only because of the balloon. What Is
an appropriate remedy if the last payment is equal to the original principal, so that
the consumer must make payments forever?
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The referral sale illustrates the difficulties of enforcing the UC.
The Administrator realistically has the power only to enjoin viola-
dons. He faces difficult problems of proving intent if he seeks to
impose a penalty, and seems barred from seeking redress through
a class action or otherwise. Any possible recovery by the consumer
is both uncertain and inappropriate. Thus it can neither deter
violations nor provide redress related to the injuries suffered. Per-
haps the public is better protected by the ambiguities of the present
law which permits such sales to be attacked as frauds 46 or as illegal
lotteries 47 with potent remedies available to the aggrieved con-
sunfer148
III. SUGG S-ran CHANGES
Any analysis of a statute involves an evaluation on two different
levels: (1) the policy decisions made by the draftsmen, and (2) the
drafting techniques used to implement them. Often it is very dif-
ficult to differentiate the two. However, one policy decision of the
U8C draftsmen stands out dearly-they seek to provide a "strong"
Administrator who will aggressively protect the consumer and as-
sume an ombudsman role. 49 This seems a wise decision and neces-
sary in the present credit economy.'15 A second policy decision is
also apparent-private enforcement has been rigidly limited, suf-
ficiently so to defeat its effectiveness. This decision cannot be logi-
cally supported. Limitations on private enforcement are not neces-
sary to provide a strong Administrator, nor to enhance his powers.
He can protect effectively without having enforcement powers vested
exclusively in him. If it is the result of a compromise among the
draftsmen, the consumers' need for alternative methods of enforce-
ment in states traditionally having underfinanced or unaggressive
146 See, e.g., Norman v. World Wide Distrib. Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115
(1963).
147 See, eg., Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash. 2d 630, 409
P.2d 160 (1965).
148 See authorities cited in notes 146-47 supra. In Norman, the court voided a
prior judgment held by the creditor and ordered rescission of the purchase agreement,
directing the buyer to return the goods. In Leach, the court held the purchase agree-
ment unenforceable and rendered a summary judgment against the creditor when it
sued for the purchase price. Such remedies are both more potent and more appro-
priate for the misled consumer than cancelling the interest charge.
149 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMIssIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REPORT OF
SPECIAL Commrrra- ON RETAIL INSTALLm.NT SALES, CONstatER CREDrr, S MAL LoANs
AND UsuRy 37 (1965).
15o See text at notes 5-8 supra.
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administrators has been ignored.151 A Uniform Act should be flex-
ible enough to operate effectively in different bureaucratic climates.
Thus, this basic policy decision should be reconsidered.
A. The Administrator's Powers
Even if the Administrator has all the personal characteristics
sought by the draftsmen, he has not been given sufficient powers to
exercise control easily and efficiently. The draftsmen have concen-
trated primarily on giving him tools to halt violations, or enjoin
them. The other possible enforcement tools have not received equal
emphasis, resulting in a slighting of the deterrent function and omis-
sion of redress capabilities. Further, there seems a preference for
formality which has resulted in the elimination of informal enforce-
ment devices. This requires the Administrator either to ignore some
violations or to escalate the conflict into the courts, an unnecessary
drain on his resources. It also slows down his speed of reaction to
serious violations. He needs a variety of powers to meet the countless
subtly different situations which will arise. The following sugges-
tions therefore accept the basic U3C policy of creating an Admin-
istrator with strong powers, and seek to improve the efficiency and
ease with which he may enforce the UC's regulatory provisions.
First, he should be given the power to issue declaratory orders,
which he presently does not have. This would provide creditors in-
formation about agency beliefs, and a method of testing those beliefs
without violating the statute to obtain approval of specific proposed
courses of conduct without risking consumer good will. The creditor
could place more reliance upon such an order than upon informal
advice, although they should be subject to reversal by courts or
rescission by the Administrator.'5 2
Second, he should have the power to accept assurances of dis-
continuance for first violations by a creditor, so that he may deal
with these violations in an informal manner if he so chooses. The
present draft allows use of this device only after an agency or a
court order is in force against a creditor. This limitation on the
availability of the device is a change from prior drafts, 158 and there
151 See text at notes 9-16 supra.
152 See note 25 supra.
153 U3C § 6.109 (Working Draft No. 4, 1967). The prior draft permitted use of
the assurance against practices "which could be restrained by the Administrator ...
or a court .. " (emphasis added.) The use of the conditional language obviated any
necessity that the practice be already subject to an administrative or court order when
the assurance is accepted.
660 [Vol. 29
U3C ENFORCEABILITY
seems to be no reason for the limitation. Further, the power of the
Administrator to attach conditions to his acceptance of the assur-
ance should be expressly stated, so that he may require redress to
consumers, reimbursement for investigation expenses, admissions
of past violations, and establishment of escrow funds to cover costs
of future violations in return for his decision not to initiate more
formal proceedings. 54 With such an enforcement tool, many cases
could be processed cheaply, allowing more efficient use of agency
resources.
Third, the Administrator should be enabled to issue orders of
broader scope through agency proceedings than under the present
draft. Although it is necessary to be able to issue cease and desist
orders, the effectiveness of the agency proceeding would be greatly
enhanced if it could also provide resolution of problems relating,
for example, to redress for aggrieved individuals. Some mechanical
drafting problems also need attention. Must the court issue an en-
forcement order if the Administrator makes the showing required
in section 6.108(5), or is this discretionary?5 5 Can defenses be inter-
posed by the creditor at this point?
Fourth, the Administrator must be able to act quickly to re-
strain violations where there is evidence of irreparable, immediate
harm threatened to large segments of the population. Thus he must
be able to seek a temporary restraining order without notice br
hearing when appropriate. 150 Equity courts are well-equipped to
determine whether prior hearings should be required, and the ex-
press limitation on the Administrator's power under the USG seems
an unnecessary interference with their normal discretionary powers.
Fifth, the Administrator has no express powers to seek redress
for individual aggrieved consumers. If the draftsmen believe that
few consumers will act affirmatively to seek such redress, and do not
promote actions by them, the Administrator must be able to bring
such actions or a vacuum may be created. The most feasible solu-
tion to this problem is to provide expressly that he may represent
consumers and bring class actions in their name to obtain any relief
154 Detailed rules need not be established, although this seems preferable and
examples exist. See notes 28 & 29 supra. The objective could also be achieved by per-
mitting the Administrator to set any "reasonable" conditions on his acceptance of the
assurance. See UCC § 2-609(2).
155 The reference is to the second sentence of USC § 6.108(5). See text at note 82
supra.
156 He should also be able to seize and condemn any forms or advertising matter
which do not comply with the statute. See note 36 supra.
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available to them, including rescission and cancellation of contracts.
He should also have power to obtain redress for himself, through
reimbursement for investigation expenses. Where a creditor has in
fact violated the statute, the costs of processing the violation should
be borne by the creditor, not the general public. Such redress will
also induce the creditor not to attempt to exhaust the Administra-
tor's resources by endless appeals. Redress to both the aggrieved con-
sumer and the Administrator should be available without regard
to the creditor's intent in committing the violation.
Sixth, the Administrator should have greater powers to seek to
penalize violations after occurrence, and thereby deter them before
occurrence. If declaratory orders are available, provision of an ab-
solute liability standard for civil penalties should be reconsidered
by the draftsmen. Even if this standard is not adopted, the present
standard, requiring proof of both repeated violations and willfulness,
is too severe. The intent requirement allows the "white-hearted"
creditor to proceed without attempting to ascertain the requirements
of a statute regulating his business. Surely, if the statute is to have
any meaning, the creditor who carelessly ignores it should be sub-
ject to sanction. Thus penalties should be available for violations
which are either repeated or willful.157
Seventh, the whole range of enforcement devices available to
process other violations should also be available to act against un-
conscionable debt collection techniques. The present provisions,
which require formal court proceedings in all circumstances, can
only inhibit understanding of the concept, and prolong the cred-
itor's uneasiness at being subject to unknown requirements. The
Administrator should be able to furnish information, including
declaratory judgments, about the agency's beliefs as to its scope.
He should also be able to process such violations through agency
proceedings, to foster agency expertise in analyzing the definitional
problems.
B. Effective Private Enforcement
The present draft of the U3G rigidly limits the enforcement
powers of the individual consumer through private action. How-
ever, under such a policy, the consumer has no protection in a state
157 The draftsmen should also reconsider their deletion of criminal sanctions for
most violations. Such sanctions may provide a powerful deterrent, even if not used,
because the violation can then never be considered only a risk of money, for which
accountants may calculate the odds. See note 48 supra.
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in which the Administrator is dominated by the industry, personally
unaggressive, or simply underfinanced from public funds. Thus the
following suggestions do not accept the basic U3C policy and seek
to provide effective private enforcement where there presently is
none.
First, the consumer's right of action against unconscionable
collection techniques should not be left in doubt. If he ever needs
the ability to act on his own initiative, without hinderance from
administrative inertia, it is when he is being harassed by all-night
telephone calls or his job is in jeopardy. There are tort theories
which are developing to deal with such situations. But if the U3C
regulates this conduct through administrative action? only, the
growth or even availability of these doctrines may b6 limited. Thus
the statute should either undertake to provide an q'ffective statutory
cause of action to redress such unconscionable conduct, or should
expressly disclaim any intention to limit the development of the
tort doctrines. It would seem preferable to deal with the problem
in a consumer protection statute, but only if it is possible to forge
as strong a remedy as will eventually be created by case law, in-
cluding recovery of all damages available in tort actions. If this is
not politically possible, development should remain in the judicial
forum, but without any interference from the statute.
Second, the statute should provide an express right of action
to redress all violations of its provisions. Earlier working drafts so
provided,158 and there is no reason for the change in Working Draft
No. 6. The attempt at creating "self-executing remedies" has in turn
created at least two unnecessary problems. Even if the courts will
recognize actions for reformation of the contract or declaratory
judgment in such circumstances, and do not limit such remedies
to defenses only,159 they can only strike a void clause. Thus they
cannot afford the consumer complete redress for the violation, but
only relief from its injurious effects. Additionally, the self-executing
remedies concept has led the draftsmen to formulate inappropriate
remedies in some situations, and remedies which are enforceable only
358 U3C § 5.201(3) (Working Draft No. 4, 1967). Further, courts should be allowed
more flexibility in designing appropriate remedies. Thus USC § 5.201(l) seems unwise.
because it expressly limits the court to the statutory formulation, whether effective or
not, and whether appropriate or not. If it were deleted, courts could exercise a useful
discretion to adapt the remedy to the numerous different types of fact patterns which
will be presented.
'59 See note 133 supra. Another problem is the recovery of attorney's fees by the
successful consumer litigant. See text following note 133 supra.
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through court orders in others.160 Thus, if Working Draft No. 6
proves anything, it is that effective private enforcement must start
from an express grant of a right of action against all violations,
and the nature of the remedies may then be developed without
artificial limitations.
Third, the consumer must be provided redress which fully
compensates him not only for the injury caused by the violation
itself but also for his actions in obtaining a correction of the vio-
lation. This concept has several ramifications. Thus, where the
matter is settled out of court, the consumer must be compensated
for his investment in attorney's fees and his own time and reputa-
tion in seeking the settlement. A consumer protection statute must
seek to route him to an attorney, and a necessary inducement is
that he not be economically penalized for seeking such counsel.
This requires that he receive, through a negotiated settlement, not
only a refund of an overcharge or the striking of a void clause, but
also an additional award to compensate him for acting. The award
suggested herein is a stated dollar amount related to a typical at-
torney's fee or cancellation of the interest charge, whichever is
greater. However, where the violation created a false inducement
to contract, such an award is entirely inappropriate, because the
consumer's basic expectations have been destroyed. The only relief
which will protect his expectations is rescission, and it should be
optionally available in all such circumstances.
Where a violating creditor refuses to settle, compelling litiga-
tion, the investments of time and money are greatly increased, so
the compensation for them must be greater. Also, the award given
the successful consumer litigant must recognize the uncertainties
of litigation and increase the award both to compensate him for
undertaking such risks and to induce him to do so. Without such
inducements, the test cases necessary to clarify the statute, and to
develop new theories to conform to changing social concepts, may
never be brought. The proper award to achieve such results would
seem to be a voiding of the obligation, both as to principal and
interest.
No compensatory award should depend upon the willfulness
of the creditor in causing the violation. Conditioning the award
on intent misconceives its purpose, and introduces an irrelevant
deterrent analysis. The lesser awards for negotiated settlements are
10 E.g., the balloon note: U3C §§ 2.405, 3.402, see note 145 supra; and tie wage
assignment: U3C §§ 2.410, 3.403, see text following note 132 supra.
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primarily compensatory and only incidentally a deterrent. The in-
crease in the awards to a successful litigant serves multiple pur-
poses. It compensates for expenses, especially awards of attorney's
fees; it provides incentive to the consumer to undertake litigation
risks; and it promotes negotiated settlements by deterring litiga-
tion. Even its deterrent function relates only to the creditor's deci-
sion to compel litigation, not to his decision to commit the original
violation. Thus, if he decides to compel litigation, his earlier lack
of mens rea in violating the statute is irrelevant to increasing the
award.
If the redress awards provided are fully compensatory, they
will also provide a deterrent to violation enforceable through pri-
vate actions. This would be available on the individual's own ini-
tiative, and could not be frustrated by agency inertia, philosophy
or underfinancing. Further, this device could provide a significant
deterrent. Although each award would be fairly small, the aggre-
gate of the possible awards to all the customers of a large-volume
creditor through a class action could add up to a formidable sum.
In those cases where such awards would not be effective, such as
a widely dispersed and diverse class, a private injunction action
seems preferable to a larger award to the individual consumer.
Thus, the draftsmen should reconsider their present decision not
to allow such actions and determine whether an appropriately
limited right in aggrieved consumers to seek such injunctions can
be devised.
IV. CONCLUSION
The UC, as presently drafted, does not provide for effective
enforcement of its regulatory provisions. A strong, well-financed
Administrator can enjoin conduct to prevent violations from re-
occurring; but he cannot redress the effects of prior violations upon
aggrieved consumers, and the deterrent provided is practically use-
less. Further, even to halt violations, court proceedings are always
required, which is costly, difficult and inefficient; and there is never
any reimbursement to the Administrator. Thus useful public en-
forcement will be provided under the UC primarily in the larger
states having large budgets for state agencies and a tradition of
aggressiveness by agencies. However, all enforcement will continu-
ally be dependent upon the mood of the legislature in establishing
budgets, which will limit the Administrator's independence.
In the smaller states, where "weak" and underfinanced agencies
are more traditional, the UC cannot be enforced. The expense of
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the formal court procedures required will preclude their use, and
the informal procedures in the statute have no express teeth. The
obvious answer to this lack of public enforcement is to provide for
effective private enforcement, but the U3C has no such provisions.
The consumer not only has no deterrent powers, but also in most
circumstances cannot obtain any appropriate redress for his griev-
ance. The draftsmen seem to have decided that consumers are in-
herently unable to protect themselves through private actions. This
is a judgment by urban attorneys which underestimates the interest
and ability of the "country lawyer" in consumer problems if there
is some likelihood of some payment. It also indicates a real differ-
ence between available resources to solve problems in rural and
urban settings. The Administrator is less likely to be effective in
the smaller states, while private action is more likely to be effective.
Effective private enforcement depends upon the solution of
two problems: The consumer must be induced to seek legal coun-
sel; and the attorney must be paid, whether he litigates or not. The
U3C attacks neither of these problems, however, which indicates to
this author that the problems have not been sufficiently analyzed.
There are similar problems in the public enforcement article, as
is illustrated by the Administrator's lack of power to obtain redress
for aggrieved individual consumers and his inability to act quickly
against mass violations creating irreparable harm. Is a statute with
this many problems still unsolved ready for either final adoption
by Commissioners or enactment by any state?161
101 Non-uniform amendments to Articles 5 and 6 of the USC are another potential
solution to these problems. Uniformity in the remedies sections is not necessary to
achieve the purposes of the statute, as is discussed in greater depth in Spanogle, Why
Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew Private Enforcement?, 28
Bus. LAW. 1039, 1053-54 (1968).
